Military-led
regimes rose in Egypt, Syria, Iraq, Algeria, and Libya, after the army
became involved in series of coups. When the army intervened in politics
in the sixties, they did not take power because of the large guns they
have or their arsenal, but they came as they knew that civilian
political institutions were weak. The stepping down of presidents
occurred in countries where military coups “bloodless coups” occurred
(Tunisia and Libya, Syria, and Egypt).
However,
once the military gained too much political control, the leaders would
often adopt strategies to suppress its power. Some of these strategies
included reasserting control over the military budget, a move performed
by the former Egyptian President Mubarak. Another method was to
repeatedly change the ministers of defense and chief of staff so as to
not allow one army leader stay long enough in power to gain a large
following and support. The switching of generals and high ranking
officers from one geographical command into another one is key dynamic
of overseeing their maneuvers. Even if the origins of some regimes lie
at the militarization of some army officers, the military has presently
retreated from active politics. However, the heads of the states remain
closely tied to the military, which therefore continued to have great
weight in Egypt, Syria, Algeria, Iraq, and Libya’ politics.
The
army emerged as a key player in the region: the corrective revolution
of Al Assad the father in Syria 1970, and Kaddafi a coup in Libya 1970.
Boumadyane seized power from his friend Ben Bella in Algeria in 1965.
Nasser and Saddam had their military coups against two strong monarchs. The
ultimate sequence of the events is that these regimes are being
personified into an extreme personalistic dictatorship where the family
members of the head of the state, and army are taking over the economic,
social, and cultural life (Ben Ali’s family, Mubarak’s…) like the
Sicilian family mafia.
What
explain political behavior of these military regimes is not the
institutional rules of the game, it is rather the informal rules of the
game. Clientelism is key element in imposing control. A relationship
emerged between patron with power and client without networks. It is an
exchange between people who have access to political power and wealth
and those who don’t. It is an exchange between two unequal entities. The
military reproduced its own class, military aristocracy, which embedded
a military human nature.
The
Egyptians army is the strongest institution of the state. They are
entrepreneurs, they manufacture consumable products, and they are
intertwined in the society which made it hard for any coup or
overthrown. They are the engineers who build the infrastructure of the
country. Education of the military officers is a crucial point. During
their training, they should be taught that the political power must be
in the hands of civilians. President Bouteflika has continuously tried
to demilitarize the state. Some of his tactics involve seeking control
of the cabinet as well as using foreign support to strengthen his power.
The ex Egyptian president, Mubarak, used balancing, cooptation, and
neo-patrimonial networks to keep the military under control. In Turkey,
the army is kept under the government’s control by the government’s
establishment to control over appointments, having greater scrutiny over
military budgets, and by passing certain constitutional revisions to
lessen the army’s power.
Demilitarization
in the Middle East has been particularly hard to achieve due to the
history of strong army involvement in the politics of the state from the
time of independence. The military plays a dominant role in many of the
revolutions to gain independence from the colonial powers, such as the
Algerian, and the Turkish. Thus post-independence, the military remained
in a leadership role. Therefore demilitarization within many Middle
Eastern states, in this case referring to the removal of army from
politics, has been difficult due to the army’s infusion with the
governing bodies and influential power within the state.
The Algerian formal political monopoly of the Party of the FLN (Front de Libération Nationale) thought to have a say over the political agenda. However,
that assessment ignored the fact that FLN was not the source of power
in the Algerian state and that the problem of authoritarianism was not a
function of its formal monopoly, but rather of the power of the
executive branch of the state over the legislative branch and the
judiciary and the fact that the executive branch as a whole has been
subject throughout to the hegemony of the military.
Demilitarizing the
Egyptian politics is a precondition in this preliminary building of
democracy. The quiet coup in Tunisia has taught Tunisians that the army
is a friend of democracy. The same prescription was prescribed in Egypt. But
in fact it is another form of Praetorianism as Huntington put it, when
political and social institutions have failed, military rule is often
perceived as a solution to this crisis and can often temporarily command
high levels of popular support
Egypt
with a history of military dominance is likely to intervene at the
political scene. The future civil personalities need to work on their
sides towards building a transitional phase where the state will be
demilitarized , by consolidating the political institutions. Mubarak was
the state, was the regime, and he was definitely the government. The
collapse of Mubarak does not mean a collapse of the man. The
transitional phase is the thin line, any false move can lead to a
slippery slope. Wise politicians has to be prudent with the blind
dismantle of the former institutions. Paul Bremer mal- grasping of real
politics pushed Iraq into a bloodshed scenario. He thought that
dismantling of “El Baath” party would help rebuilding Iraq under the
prescription of the Western formula of democracy in the Middle East. Dismantling
the army, the police, and the former regime party are thought to cure
the epidemic. The Bush administrations and new Iraqis political figures
pretended accomplishing the mission of establishing a strong state.
At this crucial phase, Egyptian, Tunisian , Libyan , Yemeni , and Syrian politicians should “empty”
the dominant or ruling party from its personalized and regime
connotation and pour it into a civilian party which can lead a strong
opposition in future. The error which has been committed by Paul Bremer
should not be repeated. Rebuilding Middle Eastern social and political
capitals is a long process, which requires will and patience. Iran is a
key player in the region. Iranians pretend that the “Arab Spring” is
simply a reflection of the spread of Islamic awakening in reference to
the Iranian revolution 1979. There is only one bridge between Bahrain
and Saudi Arabia. Bahraini Shiite are loyal to their holy man in Tehran
Temple. Iran is supporting AlHuthiyeen in Yemen and infiltrating in
Egypt after the stepping down of Mubarak.
The
current state of militarism in MENA remains dominated by an ideology,
by a corpus of domination and manipulation. We must be careful not to
engage in a voyeuristic program which tames the minds. We must keep in
mind that when we engage in understanding the mystic relation between
civilians and military in MENA, we find ourselves surrounded by muddy
waters at the same time we realize that we are not equipped with the
right tools and necessary footwear. To even speak of demilitarizing post
“Arab Spring” countries is like pouring a glass of water in the desert.
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